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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a model of crime in which human capital increases the opportunity cost of crime
from foregone work and expected costs associated with incarceration. Older, more intelligent, and
more educated adults should commit fewer street (unskilled) crimes. White collar crimes decline less
(or increase) with age and education. Predictions for age-crime and education-crime relationships
receive broad empirical support in self-report data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
and arrest data from the Uniform Crime Reports. The effects of education, training, and wage
subsidies, as well as enforcement policies on criminal behavior are discussed.
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Property and violent crime rates typically increase with age during adolescence, reach a peak during
the late teenage years, then decline thereafter. Nearly two centuries ago, Quetelet observed this
general pattern (Beirne, 1993), and it holds today for both oﬃcial arrest rates and self-reported
oﬀending rates. The age-crime proﬁle is one of the most documented relationships in criminology.
While less studied, the relationship between education and crime is equally interesting. More
than two-thirds of all incarcerated men in 1993 had not graduated from high school (Freeman,
1996). Dramatic diﬀerences in property and violent crime across education groups also exist in
both self-report and arrest data as we show below.1
These patterns suggest that studying crime within a human capital framework may be useful,
and this paper develops such a framework. This approach recognizes that education and training
increase human capital levels and market wage rates, which raises the costs of planning and engaging
in crime. Human capital investments also increase the costs associated with incarceration, since
they increase the value of any time foregone. The fact that training and learning occur throughout
life implies that the opportunity costs of crime should generally rise with age just as they rise
with educational attainment. For crimes that require little market skill (e.g. larceny, assault, drug
dealing), a human capital approach suggests that both age and education should be negatively
correlated with crime among adults. (We use the terms ‘skills’ and ‘human capital’ interchangeably.)
Of course, market skills may also increase the returns to crime, especially for white collar crimes
like forgery, fraud, and embezzlement. Participation in these crimes should peak at later ages and
should decline more slowly with age after the peak than in crimes that do not oﬀer a skill premium.
(Crimes that substantially reward skill may actually increase with age throughout life.) While
unskilled crimes should be negatively correlated with education, this need not be true for white
collar crimes. The human capital approach oﬀers some interesting and testable implications for
the age-crime and education-crime relationships depending on the skill content of a crime. These
predictions are empirically examined in this paper and generally supported by the data.
1Tauchen, Witte, and Griesenger (1994) estimate a negative relationship between education and crime in a cohort
of young men born in 1945 and living in Philadelphia between ages 10 and 18. Lochner and Moretti (2004) further
establish that education has a signiﬁcant causal (negative) impact on the subsequent criminal activity of men as
measured by self-reports, arrests, and incarceration.
2The idea that education and training raise skill levels and wage rates, which then lowers crime,
is not a new one; however, a formal theoretical framework for studying these relationships does
not yet exist. Ehrlich (1975) empirically examines a number of predictions from an intuitive model
which relates education to crime. Flinn (1986) introduces criminal behavior to a ‘learning-by-doing’
model of human capital, which assumes that workers accumulate skills as a by-product of work.2
While his model is useful for studying post-school crime and work decisions, it does not incorporate
schooling or other costly human capital investment (e.g. training) decisions. This paper is the ﬁrst
to explore crime within the more standard Becker (1964) - Ben Porath (1967) investment model
of human capital formation. This approach explicitly models decisions to work, to commit crime,
and to make costly investments in human capital (e.g. education and training). It is well-suited for
studying the dynamic interaction of education and crime choices, something that cannot be studied
within the learning-by-doing framework of Flinn (1986). Furthermore, the inherent diﬀerence in
assumptions about the learning process and the tradeoﬀs associated with learning, work, and crime
(compared with Flinn’s model) can lead to very diﬀerent policy conclusions.
The human capital approach, in its simplest form, stresses the role of wages and opportunity
costs in determining criminal activity, arguing that older, more intelligent, and more educated in-
dividuals commit less crime because they have more human capital and can earn higher wages.3
However, many things change as an individual ages, and education inﬂuences much more than a
person’s potential wage rate. Sociologists and criminologists stress biological development, matu-
rity, and/or the establishment of social networks, families, and norms as other channels through
which age and education may aﬀect decisions to engage in crime (e.g. see Hirschi and Gottfredson
1995, or Riley 1986). But, these theories do not oﬀer a convincing explanation for diﬀerential
age-crime and education-crime patterns observed across white collar, property, and violent crimes.4
2Mocan, Billups, and Overland (2000) extend the basic approach of Flinn (1986) to include learning in the criminal
sector. Imai and Krishna (2004) estimate a lifecycle model with exogenous wage growth and employment but with
endogenous criminal choices and criminal skill accumulation. Huang, Liang, and Wang (2004) incorporate a ﬁrst
stage education decision in an equilibrium search framework with both legitimate and criminal opportunities.
3There is growing empirical evidence that higher wages, both at the individual and aggregate levels, reduce crime
(e.g. Freeman 1996, Gould, et al. 2002, Grogger 1998, Machin and Meghir 2000, and Viscusi 1986). Unfortunately,
this evidence is diﬃcult to interpret when wages are endogenously determined through the process of human capital
investment. We discuss these diﬃculties below.
4As we discuss below, a purely mechanical explanation for the age-crime proﬁle resulting from increased incar-
ceration rates (or an increase in the probability of arrest) among older criminals cannot explain the sharp decline in
arrests or self-reported crime among young adults.
3The interaction of investment and crime decisions can cause the long-term eﬀects of policy or
other economic changes to diﬀer substantially from the short-term eﬀects. For example, a policy
that subsidizes schooling or job training is likely to reduce crime more in the long-run than the
short-run by increasing skill levels. In contrast, a short-term wage subsidy targeted at younger
workers may reduce crime among subsidized workers for the duration of the subsidy, but it may
actually increase crime after the subsidy ends because it discourages investment in human capital.
Human capital theory also oﬀers insights useful for analyzing traditional law enforcement policies
by recognizing that these policies can aﬀect education and training decisions in addition to criminal
behavior. Increases in skill investment associated with a crackdown on criminal activity will feed
back into subsequent criminal decisions, reducing crime more in the long-run than the short-run.
Lifecycle models of crime with exogenous wage growth (e.g. Grogger 1998) do not capture these
important dynamics.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops a lifecycle model of work, crime, and
human capital investment. The joint decisions for work, crime, and investment are characterized
and brieﬂy discussed. Section 3 studies the relationship between human capital and diﬀerent types
of crime. The predicted relationship between observed wages and crime is discussed, and other
implications of the theory are empirically examined using self-report data from the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). In particular, we estimate the relationship between educational
attainment and both property and violent crime. We also estimate how criminal participation
decisions depend on individual characteristics that are likely to reﬂect diﬀerences in learning abil-
ity, initial skill levels, and criminal opportunities. Because micro data sets typically lack data
on white collar crimes, we turn to data from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) to estimate the
relationship between average cohort education levels and cohort arrest rates for forgery and coun-
terfeiting, fraud, and embezzlement. The theory’s predictions for age-crime proﬁles are discussed
and empirically examined with the NLSY and UCR data in Section 4.
Section 5 discusses important implications for potential crime-reducing policies, including wage
and skill investment subsidies and traditional law enforcement policies. The roles of early and
adolescent interventions are also discussed. We stress the diﬀerence between short-run and long-
run impacts on crime as well as expected diﬀerences in responses across heterogeneous types of
4individuals and crimes. The role of criminal experience in determining lifecycle decisions and
policy analysis is discussed in Section 6, while Section 7 concludes.
2 A Human Capital-Based Model of Crime
This section develops a time allocation model of crime, work, and human capital investment.
Following Becker (1964) and Ben-Porath (1967), assume that skills can only be acquired through
costly time investments (e.g. education and job training) and that those skills increase the return
to work. Market skills may or may not raise the net return to crime. Individuals optimally choose
how much time to allocate each period to investment in human capital, legitimate work, and crime
with the goal of maximizing their expected lifetime income.5 If they engage in crime, they face
some probability of future incarceration. If incarcerated, they are provided a minimal level of
consumption and cannot invest, work, or engage in crime again until they are released.
Individuals are endowed with an initial skill level H0, learning ability A, and criminal ability
θ. They can choose to work, invest in their skills, and commit crime for the ﬁrst T years of life.
Denote skill levels at age t by Ht, time investment in skills, It, and time spent committing crime, kt.
Total time each period is normalized to h, so time spent working is simply h−It −kt. Individuals
can earn wtHt +ǫt per unit of time spent working, where wt represents the after-tax rental rate or
price of human capital and ǫt is a mean zero iid shock. If they invest in their human capital, they
produce future skills according to
(1) Ht+1 = Ht + f(It,Ht;A),
where f(·) is increasing and concave in each of its arguments. Education and job training are the
most obvious forms of human capital investment, but a more general interpretation recognizes that
individuals may take jobs paying low current wages if they oﬀer greater learning opportunities that
may lead to higher paying jobs in the future (see Rosen, 1972). The key assumption about learning
here is that it is costly in terms of current earnings. Individuals with a higher learning ability
receive a higher return on investments, so
∂2f
∂A∂I > 0. We allow for direct costs of investment, λ,
5The assumption of expected income maximization rather than expected utility maximization does not play an
important role in any of the results below, but it greatly simpliﬁes the exposition. The discussion assumes that
criminal returns are ﬁnancial, but this can easily be generalized to include non-monetary rewards from crime by
simply translating those gains into a consumption value.
5which may reﬂect tuition or tastes for/against school and are assumed to be net of any government
subsidy.
Time spent committing crime earns a net return of N(kt,Ht,θ,ηt) in that period, where ηt is
a mean zero iid shock to criminal returns. These returns are assumed to be strictly increasing and
concave in kt and θ and non-decreasing in Ht. More able criminals earn a higher return on their
criminal activity (i.e. ∂2N
∂θ∂k > 0), and the shock is normalized so that ∂2N
∂η∂k > 0. Individuals that
engage in crime may be caught, ﬁned F, and imprisoned at the beginning of the next period with
probability Π(kt) where Π(0) = 0, Π(h) ≤ 1, and Π′(k) > 0.6 Convicted criminals must spend
J years in prison receiving consumption c each year they are there. (It is assumed throughout
this paper that c is low relative to the potential earnings from work. It is straightforward to
allow the punishment, probability of incarceration, or sentence length to depend on an individual’s
incarceration history or age. For simplicity, these possibilities are ignored here.) While in prison,
skills may depreciate, either from lack of use or through a stigma eﬀect caused by prison, at the
rate δ ∈ [0,1] per year.7 After a prison sentence ends, individuals are released, and they resume
making investment, work, and crime decisions.
The state variables for someone who is not incarcerated include his human capital, Ht, and his
current shocks, Ξt = (ǫt,ηt). Let Vt(Ht,Ξt) represent the expected value function for an individual
who is not incarcerated at the beginning of period t conditional on his current state. For those just
incarcerated, no decisions are made and shocks are irrelevant. The only relevant state variable is the
current level of human capital. Let Ωt(Ht) represent the expected value function for someone who
has just entered prison. These functions represent expected lifetime earnings at age t conditional on
incarceration status, current human capital, and current shocks. An individual not in prison at the
beginning of period t ≤ T must decide how to allocate his time to work, investment in skills, and
crime to maximize expected discounted lifetime earnings (with time discount factor β) as described
6We do not distinguish between the probability of arrest and incarceration, though they certainly diﬀer empirically.
In our notation, the probability Π(k) best represents the probability that someone committing a crime is punished.
7We do not model decisions to invest during incarceration periods; although, most prisons and jails oﬀer some type
of training or General Educational Development (GED) certiﬁcation program. In 1997, 52% of state prison inmates
and 56% of federal prison inmates had participated in at least one education program during their incarceration
period (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). Most estimates suggest that earnings and employment decline following
an arrest or prison term; although, there has been some debate about the magnitude and duration of any eﬀects
(e.g. see Grogger, 1995, Kling, 2003, Nagin and Waldfogel, 1995, and Waldfogel, 1994). This suggests that losses in
earnings power due to stigma eﬀects and/or human capital depreciation outweigh any gains from new skills that may
be acquired in prison.
6by the Bellman equation
Vt(Ht,Ξt) = max
It,kt
{(wtHt + ǫt)(h − It − kt) + N(kt,Ht,θ,ηt) − λIt − Π(kt)F
+β [Π(kt)Ωt+1(Ht+1) + (1 − Π(kt))E(Vt+1(Ht+1,Ξt+1))]}, (2)
subject to the human capital accumulation equation (1) and time constraints
It,kt ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ It + kt ≤ h, ∀t.
The expectation E(Vt+1(Ht+1,Ξt+1)) is over the distribution of unknown shocks, Ξt+1.

















From ages T + 1 to ¯ T, the ﬁnal period of life, individuals are assumed to earn a certain in-
come proportional to their human capital (φ is the proportionality factor) if they are not already
incarcerated. We assume that they do not invest or commit crime in this period, which may reﬂect
retirement (with a pension proportional to their earnings at the end of their careers) or simply
a late stage in their careers at which time they are ﬁnished with crime and human capital in-
vestment. Since individuals do not commit crime, they will never face a new arrest during this
period; however, they may enter this stage of life in prison, in which case we assume that they serve
out their sentence and then begin earning in proportion to their human capital. We assume that
¯ T > T + J such that individuals do not die before they have served out their full sentences – this
avoids a sharp reduction in costs associated with imprisonment as individuals reach the end of their




βjφHt = ψ(β, ¯ T − t)φHt,
where ψ(·,·) is deﬁned by equation (4). Wage and criminal return shocks are irrelevant from age
T + 1 on, so they are suppressed in the value function here. When φ = wh, this represents the
discounted lifetime earnings for someone who devotes all of his remaining time to work.
7Equations (1)-(5) describe the individual’s problem over the full lifecycle. Decisions are only
made through age T and by individuals not currently in prison. We now characterize the optimality
conditions for decisionmaking non-prisoners. At an interior (individuals engaging in work, crime,
and investment),8 investment must satisfy the following ﬁrst order condition:
(6) wtHt + ǫt + λ = β
￿
Π(kt)Ω′








The marginal cost of investment (left hand side) is given by potential wage rates plus any direct
costs of investment. The marginal value of investment (right hand side) depends on the productivity
of investment as well as the probability of arrest through the expected marginal value of human
capital (the term in brackets).
The marginal value of human capital for someone who is not currently in prison at age t ≤ ¯ T
is given by the envelope condition:
∂Vt(Ht,Ξt)
∂Ht















As an individual ages, there are fewer years to reap the rewards from higher skill levels. Conse-
quently, the marginal expected value of human capital tends to decline with age for those who stay
out of prison. This, combined with rising opportunity costs (due to increases in Ht), generally




∂H for all H and




∂H ) at all ages. We assume that this condition is met, since it is only likely
to be violated in rare cases.9 Thus, human capital oﬀers a higher marginal payoﬀ for those who
avoid incarceration. This feature of the decision problem generates a discouraging aﬀect of crime
on contemporary investment. And, since the marginal value of human capital depends on future
8Empirically, most criminals contemporaneously engage in legitimate work and/or school. While nearly 80%
of males ages 16-23 reported no income from crime in the 1980 NLSY, more than 90% of those engaged in crime
reported earning more than $100 from work during the year. Most males that are not working or in school report no
involvement in crime either. The fact that most criminals also participate in the labor market is also borne out in
surveys of prison inmates. In 1986, 69% of all State prison inmates were employed at the time of their arrest (U.S.
Department of Justice, 1988).
9While this condition holds for all ages T and above, it may not hold for some ages less than T. Problems may
arise for a limited set of ages when the value function is convex in H, which may occur if f(·) is approximately linear
in H.
8returns from work and crime, investment decisions will also depend on subsequent work and crime
decisions.




= wtHt + ǫt + Π′(kt)F + βΠ′(kt)[E(Vt+1(Ht+1,Ξt+1)) − Ωt+1(Ht+1)],
reveals the balance of present returns from crime against the current loss in earnings from work
foregone, expected ﬁnes, and the potential future earnings losses associated with an increased prob-
ability of incarceration. Human capital (as determined by past investments and initial endowments)
discourages crime by raising the direct opportunity costs of time and the indirect costs through
potential lost opportunities associated with prison. To the extent that human capital makes indi-
viduals better criminals, it may also encourage crime. The balance of these forces will determine
how criminal decisions depend on past investment choices.
We consider two cases for the criminal returns to skill. On average, street criminals are quite
young, have low IQ levels (Kandel, et al., 1988, and White, Moﬃtt, and Silva, 1989), and acquire
little formal education. This suggests that the returns to traditional market skills are substan-
tially lower for common street crimes (e.g. larceny, robbery, auto theft, drug dealing) than in the
legitimate labor market. On the other hand, the returns to white collar crimes like forgery, fraud,
and embezzlement would seem to depend heavily on market skill levels. We, therefore, distinguish
between unskilled crimes, for which we assume ∂N
∂H = 0 and white collar crimes for which we expect
that ∂N
∂H > 0 and ∂2N
∂H∂k > 0.10 The human capital approach taken in this paper implies diﬀer-
ent patterns for the education-crime and age-crime relationships for these two broad categories of
crime. Much of the discussion and empirical analysis below will focus on this distinction.
How do individual endowments (A, H0, θ) inﬂuence decisions about investment and crime?
Learning ability, A, largely inﬂuences crime through past investments and their eﬀects on current
skill levels – more able individuals will generally invest more in their skills and accumulate more
skills per unit of investment. Learning ability also aﬀects the cost of imprisonment through its
role in determining future earnings potential. Thus, more able individuals should commit fewer
10We do not distinguish between two possible ways in which human capital may aﬀect the returns to crime: (i)
human capital may raise the marginal value of each crime, or (ii) it may increase the rate at which ‘good’ criminal
opportunities arise. The structure of the model is more closely aligned with the ﬁrst, but the latter is also reasonable.
Both should produce similar patterns for behavior.
9unskilled crimes at older ages (than their less able counterparts), because they will have accumulated
more human capital. At younger ages, more able individuals should commit less crime (than the
less able) because incarceration is more costly due to the high marginal productivity of foregone
learning opportunities. For low incarceration probabilities, the latter eﬀect is relatively unimportant
and diﬀerences in crime by ability will grow with age as human capital proﬁles diverge. Because
diﬀerences in skill levels will tend to persist over time for a cohort, individuals who begin life with
more human capital (H0) will tend to commit fewer unskilled crime at all ages. However, it is
diﬃcult to say whether diﬀerences in crime across individuals with heterogeneous initial skill levels
will grow or decline with age, since the eﬀect of skill on investment behavior is ambiguous. Criminal
ability directly aﬀects the returns to crime. Ceteris paribus, those with higher θ are more likely to
engage in crime at any age due to the higher marginal return from crime. But criminal ability (in
unskilled crimes) also has a reinforcing indirect eﬀect on crime at older ages through its eﬀect on
human capital investment decisions – by directly encouraging crime over work, θ indirectly reduces
the return to investment in skills causing high θ individuals to accumulate less skill. Altogether,
factors that reﬂect high A and H0 or low θ should be negatively correlated with unskilled crime.
All of these relationships are likely to be muted (or even perverse) for more skill-intensive white
collar crimes.
Due to their eﬀects on the accumulation of skills, temporary shocks to wages or criminal returns
will have lasting impacts on crime. A positive shock to wages will cause individuals to substitute
their time from crime and skill investment into work that period. While current crime is reduced by
a positive labor market shock, future unskilled crime may increase due to reductions in investment.
The long-term eﬀects on white collar crime depend on whether or not their returns to human capital
are greater than the labor market returns.11
A positive shock to criminal returns causes individuals to substitute some of their time from work
and investment to crime. Investment declines among workers not because the current opportunity
cost of investment has risen – this is determined by the wage rate for workers. But, investment
11Recessions characterized by temporary declines in skill prices should reduce the opportunity cost of investment
and crime, leading to short-term increases in both. (Studying the relationship between college enrollment and the
business cycle, Betts and McFarland (1995) and Dellas and Sakellaris (2003) estimate that a one percent increase in
the unemployment rate increases enrollment in college by 2-4%.) This implies that post-recession human capital levels
should be higher and unskilled crime rates lower than they would otherwise have been. The eﬀects on post-recession
white collar crimes are ambiguous.
10declines because an increase in current crime raises the probability of incarceration next period,
which reduces the return on investment. Among non-workers (i.e. student-criminals), the current
opportunity cost of investment does increase with ηt, since the opportunity cost is simply the
marginal return to crime.12 In general, a positive shock to criminal returns will increase both
current and future crime, where the latter eﬀect will be larger among student-criminals than working
criminals.
3 The Relationship between Human Capital and Crime
A number of recent studies (e.g. Freeman, 1996, Gould, et al., 2002, Grogger, 1998, Machin and
Meghir, 2000, and Viscusi, 1986) have empirically estimated a signiﬁcant negative correlation be-
tween wages and crime using both cross-sectional variation in individual wages and time series
variation in average wages across locations. To the extent that wages measure the opportunity
costs of crime, this would seem to be strong evidence in favor of a human capital theory of crime.
Unfortunately, opportunity costs and human capital are not necessarily well-measured by observed
wages. Instead, observed wages represent a combination of skill prices, human capital levels, and
on-the-job investment. For someone spending the fraction I∗
t ≡ It
1−kt of their time on the job in-
vesting in new skills, his observed wage rate will be Wt = wtHt(1 − I∗
t ). Compared with the right
hand side of equation (8), this clearly does not reﬂect the opportunity cost of crime even when
potential punishments are ignored. In general, observed wages are less than potential wages and
understate the opportunity cost of crime when some time on the job is spent learning new skills
rather than producing output.
How important is unobserved investment, and what are the implications of ignoring it? Heck-
man, Lochner, and Taber (1998) estimate that at early ages as much as 50-60% of time on the job
is spent investing in new skills, and that the most skilled also invest the most. Thus, cross-sectional
diﬀerences in observed wage are compressed relative to human capital diﬀerences among young


















11workers. Lochner (1998) shows that this distinction is empirically important when studying crime.
While average wage rates for males age seventeen are remarkably similar across AFQT quartiles,
crime rates are nearly three times higher for those in the lowest quartile relative to those in the
highest. To account for unobserved on-the-job training, Lochner (1998) estimates a lifecycle human
capital model and ﬁnds that human capital levels are about 50% higher for young males in the
highest AFQT quartile than for those in the lowest quartile. In this light, the dramatic diﬀerences
in crime are not surprising.
This calls into question the value of estimating the wage-crime relationship without accounting
for unobserved diﬀerences in investment. Since most crime is committed by young males, estimates
tend to focus on them. But, this is precisely the group for which skill investments are important
and for which wages least accurately measure skill levels and the actual price of time. When
investment is positively correlated with human capital levels (i.e. the most skilled also invest the
most), cross-sectional estimates of the wage-crime elasticity will tend to understate the elasticity
of crime with respect to human capital since diﬀerences in observed wages are compressed relative
to diﬀerences in skill levels. The diﬀerence between observed and potential wage rates implies that
estimated wage-crime relationships do not provide a measure of the impact of an increase in human
capital or an increase in skill prices (e.g. through lower tax rates or wage subsidies) on crime.13
We do not attempt to directly estimate the relationship between human capital levels and crime.
Instead, we proceed by examining a number of important predictions of the theory for education-
crime and age-crime relationships to see whether they are supported by the data. We establish
that education-crime correlations should be negative (both unconditionally and conditional on
permanent factors aﬀecting investment decisions) for unskilled crimes, while they should be less
negative or may even be positive for white collar crimes. Determinants of learning ability should
also be negatively correlated with unskilled crimes but not necessarily with white collar crimes.
We empirically examine these predictions using data from the NLSY and UCR. In the following
section, we examine predicted diﬀerences in age-crime patterns across unskilled and white collar
13Wages do not represent the opportunity cost of time in a learning-by-doing framework like Flinn (1986) either.
In that environment, work generates current earnings and increases future skill levels. Thus, the opportunity cost of
crime includes both current wage rates and the increase in future earnings that would result from an extra hour of
current work. As long as skills are acquired endogenously, observed wage rates do not reﬂect the marginal value of
time.
12crimes.
Before we discuss education-crime relationships, it is important to understand what drives hu-
man capital-crime relationships. First, consider unskilled crimes, which oﬀer no reward for human
capital. Conditional on ability and other permanent characteristics, adults with high current skill
levels face low opportunity costs of crime and should, on average, commit less crime. As such,
past investments and education should be negatively correlated with current unskilled crime rates
conditional on ability and initial skill levels. Of course investments and education are endoge-
nous. Individuals that expect to commit a lot of unskilled crime in the future regardless of their
current investments in skill (e.g. individuals with a high θ) have little incentive to make any invest-
ment. Thus, variation in criminal opportunities can also generate a negative correlation between
educational attainment and unskilled crime.
Since a higher A and a lower θ cause individuals to invest more and commit less unskilled
crime, their joint distribution is important for determining the correlation between educational
attainment and unskilled crime in the population. Holding either of these endowments constant in
the population, we should expect a negative correlation between schooling and unskilled crime.14
A positive correlation between education and unskilled crime is, therefore, only likely to arise if
A and θ are strongly positively correlated, in which case the best criminals are also the brightest.
Given the lower than average IQ levels of most criminals (Kandel, et al., 1988, and White, Moﬃtt,
and Silva, 1989), this seems unlikely.
The correlation between white collar crime and education will typically be less negative (and
may even be positive). This is because a high A leads to greater investment, but that investment
need not cause individuals to commit less white collar crime. And, while a high θ encourages white
collar crime, it need not cause individuals to invest less in their skills if those skills pay oﬀ in both
the legitimate and criminal sectors. Thus, two important forces generating a negative correlation
between unskilled crime and educational attainment are less powerful for white collar crime.
While individual endowments are important determinants of investment, work, and crime deci-
sions, they are not the only factors aﬀecting the education-crime relationship. As discussed earlier,
shocks to wage earnings, ǫt, and criminal returns, ηt, will inﬂuence both current and future deci-
14While H0 should be negatively correlated with unskilled crime, it is more neutral with respect to investment
since human capital increases both the returns and costs of investing.
13sions. A strong positive wage or crime shock during the teenage years may cause some individuals
to drop out of school, which should then aﬀect subsequent decisions about crime. These exogenous
shocks only aﬀect subsequent crime through diﬀerences in accumulated human capital levels. Vari-
ation in the costs of or tastes for schooling (embodied in λ) may also aﬀect the education-crime
relationship among adults. To the extent that these costs or tastes are largely related to formal
schooling and not informal on-the-job investment in skills, they only aﬀect this relationship through
accumulated skill levels.
We are interested in both the unconditional correlation between education and crime as well
as the direct eﬀect of educational attainment on current crime. The former is easily examined
empirically, but the latter is more diﬃcult to estimate when individual endowments vary in the
population. To facilitate discussion of the empirical analysis that follows, we consider a number
of simpliﬁcations that map the criminal decision embodied in equation (8) into a standard probit
framework. While some of these assumptions are strong, they incorporate the main insights of the
theory and are useful for interpreting the empirical ﬁndings. We begin by specifying a quadratic
criminal return function,







and a linear apprehension function, Π(k) = πk. From the ﬁrst order condition for crime (equation
8), an individual will engage in crime (i.e. kt > 0) if and only if
ǫt − ηt < θ + (χ − wt)Ht − πF − βπ [E(Vt+1(Ht+1,Ξt+1)) − Ωt+1(Ht+1)].
Now, suppose Ai = βAZi + ξiA, Hi0 = βHZi + ξiH, and θi = βθZi + ξiθ, where Zi represents a
vector of observed characteristics and the ξij terms represent unobserved determinants of the three
main endowments in the model (assume that these unobservables are mean zero and independent
of Zi). We speciﬁcally include individual i subscripts to make clear which parameters/variables are
individual-speciﬁc. Further, assume that human capital for adults at age t can be approximated
by the following linear function:
Hit(Si,Ai,θi,Hi0) = α0 + α1t + α2Si + α3Ai + α4Hi0 + α5θi
= α0 + α1t + α2Si + (α3βA + α4βH + α5βθ)Zi + α3ξiA + α4ξiH + α5ξiθ
14where Si represents total years of acquired schooling. Investments in human capital are reﬂected
in acquired schooling as well as age (empirically, we allow for a more general relationship between
age and human capital), which is assumed to account for on-the-job learning. Abilities and initial
skill levels may also aﬀect human capital levels. While the model implies that endowments are
likely to interact with investments (schooling and age), these interactions are suppressed here for
simplicity.15 Theory suggests that α1, α2, α3, and α4 should all be positive while α5 is likely to
be negative. Finally, assume that the expected cost of incarceration is linear in human capital and
sentence length, Ji, within an individual’s jurisdiction, so
E(Vi,t+1(Hi,t+1,Ξi,t+1)) − Ωi,t+1(Hi,t+1) = γ0 + γ1Hi,t+1 + γ2Ji,
where theory suggests that γ1 ≥ 0 and γ2 ≥ 0. This speciﬁcation makes the eﬀects of sentence
length on incarceration costs explicit and allows for the fact that individuals may face diﬀerent
sentencing guidelines depending on where they live.16
These approximations (along with the assumption that wt = w for all t) produce the following
decision rule for criminal participation: an age t individual will engage in crime if and only if
(9) ǫit − ηit < δ0 + δ1t + δ2Si + δ3Zi − π(Fi + βγ2Ji) + ξi,
where δ1 = (χ−w−πβγ1)α1, δ2 = (χ−w−πβγ1)α2, δ3 = βθ+(χ−w−πβγ1)(α3βA+α4βH+α5βθ),
and ξi = ξiθ +(χ−w −πβγ1)(α3ξiA +α4ξiH +α5ξiθ). The reduced form parameters represent the
causal eﬀects of age, schooling, and individual characteristics on criminal participation through their
eﬀects on human capital and the expected cost of incarceration. If human capital provides a higher
payoﬀ in the labor market than the criminal sector, then w > χ. In this case, theory implies that
δ1 and δ2 should be negative (i.e. criminal participation declines with age and education). Factors
that reﬂect higher learning ability and initial skill levels and lower criminal abilities should reduce
crime. More generally, the coeﬃcient on an individual Zi characteristic (e.g. parental education or
family composition) will depend on the relative strength of that factor in determining A, H0, and
15The suppression of interaction terms does not eliminate a role for observed and unobserved endowments in
determining crime or education decisions. Because schooling decisions depend on individual endowments, it is likely
to be correlated with both Zi and the ξi terms. The endogeneity of educational attainment is discussed further below.
16Theory further suggests that the costs of incarceration may be increasing more in sentence length for more skilled
individuals (i.e. the expected costs speciﬁcation should include an interaction between J and Ht+1). This interaction
is assumed to be zero here to keep the estimating equation simple, but this assumption is not rejected empirically.
15θ, as well as the relative strength of those endowments in determining human capital levels.17
With data rich in measures of individual ability, family background, and the local environment,
we can hope to capture the variation in A, H0, and θ with observable Zi characteristics. In this case,
probit estimation of equation (9), assuming ǫit and ηit are both distributed normally, will produce
unbiased estimates of the δ’s (up to scale). We, therefore, use data from the NLSY, which contains
rich measures of cognitive ability, family background, schooling, and geographic location (which
can be used to link individuals with their state-level law enforcement parameters) to estimate the
reduced form δ parameters (up to scale) for both violent and property crimes.
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that we can capture all of the relevant variation in indi-
vidual characteristics (determining A, H0, and θ) and enforcement policies. When unobservable
heterogeneity remains (in the form of ξi), it is likely that estimates of δ2 will be negatively biased.18
This is because individuals with a higher A or lower θ are likely to invest more in their human cap-
ital and to commit less crime. Thus, ξi is likely to be negatively correlated with schooling choices.
Fortunately, results from Lochner and Moretti (2004) suggest that this may not be too important
empirically. They obtain similar estimates of the eﬀects of education on arrests and incarceration
whether or not they instrument for schooling (using compulsory schooling laws as an instrument)
once adequate eﬀorts have been made to account for important observable factors.19 We return to
this issue below.
An individual-level analysis is not possible for white collar crime given the lack of micro data
related to the issue. Therefore, we turn to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data on arrests
for forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, and embezzlement by age and state to examine the relationship
between education and white collar crime. We follow the approach of Lochner and Moretti (2004),
generating estimates comparable to theirs for violent and property crime.
Self-Reported Violent and Property Crime in the NLSY
The NLSY has followed 12,686 individuals since 1979 and contains information on annual earnings
from work, educational attainment, and numerous variables reﬂecting the family and environment
17Allowing π to vary across individuals would produce a random coeﬃcient model. Alternatively, one could use
state-level measures of the probability of arrest, interacting this with schooling and individual characteristics. We
simply consider diﬀerences in expected prison sentences, Ji, across states.
18Of course, estimates for other parameters are also likely to be biased when unobserved heterogeneity exists.
19They use Census and UCR data, which contain far fewer covariates than used here.
16in which individuals grew up. The survey also reports scores on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test
(AFQT), which measures combined math and verbal aptitude.20 In 1980, when most respondents
were ages 15-22, the survey asked a number of questions about participation in crime and delin-
quent activities. We examine whether or not an individual reported any income from crime21 and
whether or not they engaged in thefts of at least $50 in value or shoplifting. Because the theory
easily generalizes to cases for which crime provides utility rather than income (simply re-interpret
N(k,H,θ,η) as the utility from crime in monetary value), we also analyze violent crimes, which
consist of using force to get something or attacking with intent to injure or kill (i.e. robbery and
assault). Table 1 reports criminal participation rates for 20-23 year old men in 1980 according to
their education background. By all measures, high school dropouts are much more likely to engage
in crime than are high school graduates and individuals attending college. Nearly 30% of young
men with less than 10 years of schooling reported earning some income from crime and 33% of
those with 10 or 11 years of education earned an income from crime. Among high school graduates,
only 24% of those not continuing on in school earned some income from crime while 17% of those
continuing to college did.
These results strongly support the prediction that education and unskilled crime are negatively
correlated in the population. We now turn to estimation of the direct eﬀects of educational at-
tainment on criminal participation, accounting for diﬀerences in observable characteristics. We are
also interested in the extent to which factors that may aﬀect ability, initial skill levels, and crimi-
nal opportunities aﬀect crime. We, therefore, estimate equation (9) using standard probit models
for criminal participation controlling for high school graduation status, age and age-squared (in
months), race and ethnicity, parental education, family income at age 14, whether or not the re-
spondent lived with both parents at age 14, residence in an SMSA, local unemployment rates, and
the ratio of total incarcerated adults to the total number of reported violent index crimes in the
respondent’s state of residence (a measure of state law enforcement punitiveness used by Levitt,
1998). We interpret the latter as diﬀerences in eﬀective sentence lengths, J, although it may also
reﬂect diﬀerences in the probability of incarceration or arrest across states.
20The battery of tests that make up AFQT scores were administered to respondents as part of the NLSY survey.
21Non-responses are coded as if they earned an income from crime, since their subsequent incarceration rate from
1981-93 is even higher than those reporting an income from crime. (The results are very similar if non-respondents
are omitted.)
17Table 2 reports the results of these probit models for three diﬀerent subsamples of males in the
NLSY using criminal income as a measure for criminal participation. (Results are quite similar for
other measures of crime.) Column 1 is based on a sample of all men ages 18-23; column 2 restricts
the sample to those not enrolled in school; and column 3 uses only males living in a central city.
Both high school graduation and AFQT are strongly negatively correlated with crime even when
controlling for race, rich measures of family background, and local conditions. The fact that AFQT
reduces crime both directly and indirectly by increasing schooling attainment strongly suggests
that it largely reﬂects learning ability A and initial skill levels H0.22 If human capital investments,
along with math and verbal skills, do increase the return to property crime (θ), their eﬀects on
market skills appear to be substantially greater. Restricting the sample to those who are no longer
enrolled in school (column 2) or those living in a central city (column 3) has little eﬀect on the
estimates. For respondents living in a central city, where crime is most rampant, we ﬁnd very
similar patterns for the coeﬃcient estimates; however, the large reduction in sample size leads to
substantial increases in standard errors.
As one might expect, young men from an intact family (both parents present at age 14) and with
more educated mothers are signiﬁcantly less likely to commit crime. This may reﬂect the fact that
children growing up in intact families with more educated mothers have higher learning abilities
or initial market skill levels, or they may face worse criminal opportunities. It is impossible to
disentangle the eﬀects of background characteristics on A, H0, and θ from these results. Hispanics
are signiﬁcantly less likely to commit crime than whites, but there is little diﬀerence between
black and white rates of criminal participation after controlling for other factors. There is little
eﬀect of age on crime, but this is not necessarily surprising given the small variation in age in
our sample.23 Stricter state punishments signiﬁcantly reduce criminal participation, suggesting
that law enforcement policies play an important role in criminal decisions. Unlike estimates using
aggregate arrest or crime rates, these estimates capture the deterrent eﬀects of an increased expected
incarceration period since they are based on self-reported participation in the free population.24
22Using indicator variables for AFQT quartiles rather than assuming a linear relationship yields similar conclusions.
23Furthermore, it is well-known that AFQT scores are increasing in age (e.g. see Neal and Johnson, 1996). These
results are, therefore, consistent with the model in that reductions in crime with age (among young adult males, at
least) are largely due to the growth in ability/skill with age.
24In speciﬁcations that control for education-punishment and AFQT-punishment interactions, the coeﬃcients on
those regressors are not statistically signiﬁcant and other estimated coeﬃcients are qualitatively similar to those
18Table 3 reports the average diﬀerence in self-reported criminal participation between high school
graduates and dropouts using probit speciﬁcations to control for background, ability, and local
conditions (speciﬁcations identical to those of column 1 in Table 2). The ﬁrst column reports the
average probability that a young man commits each crime. Columns 2 and 3 report estimates of
the coeﬃcients and standard errors for high school graduation, while column 4 uses the coeﬃcient
estimates to calculate the average diﬀerence in the probability of criminal participation for high
school graduates relative to dropouts. High school graduates are much less likely to engage in
property, drug, and violent crimes even after controlling for AFQT, family background, and local
conditions. On average, graduates are nine percentage points less likely to earn an income from
crime than are dropouts – this diﬀerence is about 30% of the average probability of dropouts.
When compared with a dropout, a high school graduate has about a ten percentage point lower
probability of committing a violent or property crime. The ﬁnal row reports the graduate-dropout
diﬀerence in the probability of incarceration in any year from 1981-1985 (the ﬁve years following
the self-report measures).25 As with the self-reported measures of crime, this shows a substantial
diﬀerence by education. High school graduates are 2.8 percentage points (or 81%) less likely to be
incarcerated over a ﬁve year period than are drop outs. This provides additional conﬁdence in the
self-report measures, and suggests that schooling is strongly correlated with crime at all margins
of criminal involvement.
These estimates suggest that education is negatively correlated with violent and property crimes
even after controlling for a number of important individual, family, and community characteristics.
Still, the model outlined above suggests that education is not likely to be exogenous, and one should
be cautious in interpreting these ﬁndings. Figure 1 shows that diﬀerences in criminal participation
by ﬁnal education status emerge at young ages when respondents are still in school. Because the
NLSY has followed respondents since the 1980 survey, it is possible to determine their ﬁnal schooling
attainment. Figure 1 uses this measure of schooling (not current schooling levels) to separate the
sample into those who complete high school and those who do not. For all self-reported measures of
crime, participation is higher from ages 15-22 for those who ﬁnish high school. Most interestingly,
reported in Table 2.
25A person is considered incarcerated if they were interviewed in jail.
19dramatic diﬀerences in criminal activity are already apparent at age ﬁfteen.26 (Panel data from
the National Youth Survey reveals that these diﬀerences are apparent as early as age 13.)
In an eﬀort to account for unobserved heterogeneity, Lochner and Moretti (2004) use changes
in compulsory schooling laws over time as an instrument for education. They examine the eﬀects of
schooling on the probability of incarceration and on arrest rates, ﬁnding that education signiﬁcantly
reduces both. More interestingly, their estimates are quite similar whether or not they instrument
for schooling, which suggests that endogeneity of schooling decisions does not appear to bias es-
timates of the impact of education on crime.27 How can this be reconciled with Figure 1, which
suggests that diﬀerences in criminal behavior emerge at early ages for those choosing diﬀerent levels
of ﬁnal schooling attainment? Put another way, what unobserved factors cause some individuals
to engage in crime at young ages and drop out of school early but do not directly cause them to
commit more crime at later ages?
Strictly speaking, the latter condition (that the unobserved factors do not directly aﬀect crime
at later ages) rules out explanations that are based on characteristics that aﬀect individual endow-
ments A, H0, and θ.28 Instead, consider two alternative possibilities. First, individuals may face
(unobserved) diﬀerences in the costs of schooling or may have diﬀerent tastes for schooling (both
embodied in λ). If diﬀerences in these tastes/costs are largely associated with formal schooling and
not informal post-schooling investment, then they will aﬀect schooling and early criminal decisions
without having any direct eﬀect on post-school criminal behavior. To the extent that these diﬀer-
ences have an important eﬀect on high school dropout, they could generate the patterns observed
in Figure 1 and would not induce any bias in probit estimates of equation (9). A second possibility
is that positive shocks to criminal returns cause some youth to engage in crime and quit school
early to take advantage of lucrative criminal opportunities. As long as these shocks are temporary,
they will only aﬀect adult crime through schooling choices and should not bias probit estimates of
26We also explored probit speciﬁcations like those reported in Tables 2 and 3 for NLSY respondents ages 17 and
less, using ﬁnal educational status rather than current status. For all but violent crimes, the estimated high school
graduate - dropout diﬀerences were negative but smaller than those in Table 3.
27It is also worth noting that their results for incarceration suggest similar eﬀects to those shown in Table 3.
28However, to the extent that A largely aﬀects crime through past investments, especially among individuals who
have ﬁnished school, failure to adequately account for diﬀerences in A might cause little bias in probit estimates of
the eﬀect of educational attainment on crime among adults ﬁnished with school. At the same time, youth with higher
A may choose to engage in less crime while in school, consistent with Figure 1.
20equation (9).29 Both of these scenarios rely on dynamic eﬀects of early decisions on future crime
through schooling decisions.
Education and White Collar Crime
The implication that education and unskilled crime are negatively correlated receives empirical
support in the NLSY as well as in arrest data from the Uniform Crime Reports (see Lochner and
Moretti 2004). But, human capital theory suggests a less negative, or even a positive, correlation
between white collar crime and schooling. Is this empirically true?
Unfortunately, we cannot analyze white collar crime in the NLSY. However, we can follow
the approach of Lochner and Moretti (2004), who study arrests for violent and property crime,
to examine the relationship between schooling and arrests for white collar crime (deﬁned here as
forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, and embezzlement) using the UCR data on arrests and Census
data on schooling and population characteristics.30 More speciﬁcally, we estimate the relationship
between average educational attainment and arrest rates across diﬀerent cohorts of men from
each state, controlling for state-speciﬁc year eﬀects, state-speciﬁc age patterns, oﬀense-speciﬁc
year eﬀects, oﬀense-speciﬁc age eﬀects, and the fraction of a cohort in each state that is black.31
Identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of education on crime comes from diﬀerences in education levels and
crime rates across cohorts within a state over time.
While estimates from Lochner and Moretti (2004) imply that a one-year increase in average
schooling levels would reduce both violent (murder, rape, robbery, and assault) and property (bur-
29The data suggest that few youth drop out of school because they become incarcerated, an impact that would
bias probit estimates.
30For violent and property crimes, Lochner and Moretti (2004) establish a strong correlation between arrests and
crime rates by state and year, which suggests that variation in arrest rates closely tracks variation in actual crimes
committed. This check is more diﬃcult to implement for white collar crime given the lack of incident reports for
these crimes.
31Arrests by state (plus Washington, DC), criminal oﬀense (forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, and embezzlement),
and age (ages 20-24, 25-30,...,60-64) are taken from the 1960, 1970, and 1980 UCR. Education and the fraction black
by age and state are taken from the corresponding U.S. Censuses. Estimates are based on the following regression
speciﬁcation:
lnAcast = βEast + γBast + dst + dsa + dct + dac + εcast
where lnAcast is the logarithm of the male arrest rate (number of arrests per person) for crime c, age group a, in state
s in year t; East is average years of schooling and Bast is the percent black among males in age group a in state s at
time t. The d’s represent indicator variables that account for unobserved heterogeneity across states, years, cohorts,
and criminal oﬀense types: dst is a state×year eﬀect that absorbs time varying, state-speciﬁc shocks or policies; dsa
terms absorb long-term state×age heterogeneity in arrest rates; dct terms absorb crime-speciﬁc time trends in arrests;
and dac account for crime-speciﬁc age patterns. Each observation is a crime-age-state-year cell, and all observations
are weighted by cell population size.
21glary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson) arrest rates by slightly more than 10% (both estimates
are statistically signiﬁcant at 0.05 levels), our estimates suggest that white collar arrest rates would
increase by 11% (standard error of 7.3%).32 Across cohorts, increases in average education are
associated with signiﬁcant declines in property and violent crime and with insigniﬁcant increases
in white collar crime. These relationships are consistent with our human capital theory of crime if
white collar crimes oﬀer a high reward to human capital but unskilled crimes do not.33
4 Explaining Age-Crime Proﬁles
As human capital accumulates with age, opportunity costs from foregoing legitimate work tend to
increase. The cost of spending time in prison is also likely to increase. Consequently, age-crime
proﬁles (for unskilled crimes) will tend to be declining for individuals engaged in work, crime, and
investment. This, of course, abstracts from the unlucky outcome of imprisonment, which can cause
human capital to decline rather than increase. We discuss depreciation of skills associated with
incarceration in Section 5.
While unskilled crime should decline, on average, with age among working individuals, criminal
activity may increase with age for youth who have not yet begun to work. For those whose returns
to investment and crime are so high that they choose not to work (at young ages), it is optimal to
choose investment and crime such that the net marginal returns to each are equated. If the returns
to investment decline relative to the returns to crime as a young individual ages and accumulates
human capital, investment may decline while criminal activity increases prior to entry into the labor
market. But, once an individual begins working, both investment and crime are determined by the
marginal value of work (wtHt), which generally increases with age as human capital accumulates.
Thus, the model can produce a single-peaked age-crime proﬁle (even for unskilled crimes), with the
peak at or before the age of labor market entry. Moreover, since engagement in unskilled crime
depends negatively on human capital levels (among those who work), the model predicts that
32Lochner and Moretti (2004) also include data from 1960 in their regressions, but they estimate otherwise identical
speciﬁcations to that presented here. When we use the same sample as is used here to estimate the eﬀects of cohort
schooling levels on violent and property crime rates, we obtain slightly larger estimated eﬀects for violent crime and
slightly smaller estimates for property crime – both are statistically signiﬁcant.
33As with the NLSY estimates, one should interpret these results with caution due to the endogeneity of schooling.
The fact that Lochner and Moretti (2004) ﬁnd little diﬀerence in estimated eﬀects on arrest rates using ordinary least
squares or instrumental variables techniques suggests that this is not an important concern.
22unskilled crime rates should decline most quickly at ages when human capital levels are increasing
at their fastest rate – early in work careers.
Figure 2 shows a peak in arrests rates for both property and violent crimes at ages 16-18,
roughly the age most males (especially those of lower ability) enter the labor market. The decline
in property crime is rapid in the few years after the peak, tapering oﬀ after age 25. Similar patterns
are observed over ages 15-22 for self-reported crime in the NLSY as seen in Figure 3. Patterns for
self-reported crime suggest that the decline in arrest rates shown in Figure 2 is not simply the
result of high incarceration rates and incapacitation eﬀects among criminally active young adults
as discussed in Leung (1994). Crime declines with age even in the general population.34 Levitt
(1998) shows that crime declines more (or increases less) at the age of majority in states with more
severe punishments for adults relative to juveniles. Dramatic diﬀerences in relative punitiveness in
some states may contribute to the peak in violent and property crime around age 17; however, it
seems unlikely that they account for much of the overall decline that occurs after age 18.
To the extent that human capital increases the marginal returns to white collar crimes, the
model predicts that those crimes should decline more slowly with age. Skilled crimes may even
increase with age among workers if their returns to human capital are high enough. Figure 2 shows
that white collar crimes do indeed peak at a later age and decline more slowly with age. To the
extent that human capital also reduces the probability of arrest among white collar criminals, the
age-crime proﬁle should be even ﬂatter and may peak later than the age-arrest proﬁle for these
crimes.
Diﬀerences in learning ability, A, and criminal ability or opportunities, θ, can lead to diﬀerent
age-crime proﬁles. Those with higher learning ability and/or lower criminal ability should exhibit
steeper age-crime proﬁles for unskilled crime but not necessarily for white collar crime. This
suggests that we may observe unskilled criminal activity among teenagers across a wide range of
abilities, but we are less likely to ﬁnd more intelligent adults engaged in such crimes. Variation in
criminal opportunities across communities is likely to lead to heterogeneity in age-crime proﬁles.
Neighborhoods with lucrative criminal opportunities should contain more aging criminals than less
crime-friendly neighborhoods, even if they have similar crime rates among adolescents.
34Very few NLSY respondents are incarcerated over these ages, so self-reported crime rates are representative of
the full population.
23We have stressed the role of skill accumulation in determining age-crime patterns.35 Other
theories of crime stress individual maturity or biological factors as a reason for decreased criminal
activity with age, or they posit that individuals become more attached to the rest of society as they
become older, building social networks through activities like work or marriage (e.g. see Hirschi and
Gottfredson, 1995, or Riley, 1986). It is diﬃcult to reconcile these theories with the later peak and
slower decline in age-crime proﬁles for white collar crimes than for lesser skilled property or violent
crimes. The human capital approach presented here oﬀers a useful and intuitive explanation.
In environments with little skill formation (i.e. low A societies), human capital theory predicts
that age-crime proﬁles should be relatively ﬂat. Comparing arrest rates for index property crimes
by age in 1980 with property crime rates measured by Quetelet (Beirne, 1993) in the late 1820s
(when skill investments were presumably much lower), we ﬁnd that property crime rates decline
substantially faster with age today. Quetelet found that property crime rates among males fell
by less than 7% as they aged from their late teenage years into their early thirties; whereas in
recent years, arrest rates for property crime among males declined by more than 75% over the same
age range. Rates of self-reported property crime also fall faster with age in the NLSY as seen in
Figure 3. It would be diﬃcult to argue that individuals mature much faster today or that they
are integrated into society at a younger age than in the early 1800s. In fact, conventional thinking
might suggest the opposite. One might also expect ﬂatter age-crime proﬁles in countries with less
education and training than in the U.S. To date, however, it has been diﬃcult to ﬁnd reliable and
comparable data on age-crime proﬁles across a wide range of countries.
5 Policy Lessons
When skills are endogenously determined, it is important to distinguish between the long-run and
short-run eﬀects of a change in policy. The long-run eﬀects take into account the impacts policies
have on skill acquisition, while short-run eﬀects do not. Because many policies that aﬀect crime
35In the NLSY, it is possible to estimate wage growth rates for young males no longer enrolled in school based on
their criminal status in 1980. Controlling for years of schooling, race, and AFQT percentiles, estimated wage growth
rates over the 1980-85 period were positive for males (ages 20-23 in 1980) that committed a property crime (wage
growth rate of 4.3% per year) or a violent crime (1.3% growth rate), although they were lower than wage growth
rates for males who did not report participation in crime (4.7% growth rate). Similar growth rates are estimated
when background variables are not controlled for. These patterns are consistent with the theory developed in this
paper and the fact that violent crime tends to decline more slowly with age than does property crime.
24or work decisions will also aﬀect investment decisions, their short-term and long-term impacts may
diﬀer substantially. We begin by discussing the eﬀects of wage taxes and subsidies, followed by
a discussion of education and training subsidies. Then, we explore the eﬀects of traditional law
enforcement strategies while accounting for their impacts on skill formation. Finally, we brieﬂy
discuss the potential for intervention programs that may aﬀect early skill levels, abilities, and
criminal opportunities.
Tax and Subsidy Policies
Consider the immediate eﬀects of a permanent reduction in wage taxes (or a wage subsidy) –
captured by a proportional increase in wt for all current and future periods. As can be seen from
the ﬁrst order conditions for investment and crime, such a policy would raise the direct opportunity
costs for both. While not immediately clear from equation (6), a permanent wage subsidy would
also increase the returns to investment by increasing the marginal value of human capital.36 It will
also raise the costs associated with prison, since work foregone while incarcerated would pay more.
In the traditional human capital literature, a change in ﬂat wage tax rates has no aﬀect on human
capital because both the returns and costs change at the same rate. Here, this neutrality result no
longer holds since tax rates also aﬀect crime. By raising the opportunity cost of crime (as well as the
cost of incarceration), a wage subsidy should directly discourage crime at all ages (even assuming
human capital investments are unaﬀected). The tendency for individuals to commit less crime and
to work more in the future increases the marginal value of human capital and tips the scale in
favor of increased investment. Increases in investment raise human capital levels, which further
discourages unskilled crimes. Thus, the long-term eﬀects on unskilled crime among older workers
should be greater than the short-term eﬀects. The endogeneity of both crime and investment leads
to even larger long-term eﬀects from permanent tax changes than one would expect if either were
exogenous.
These results are important for the design of tax and welfare policy. For example, the current
structure of U.S. tax code and welfare system can impose extremely high eﬀective marginal tax
rates (sometimes above 50%) for the unskilled.37 Since criminal earnings are not reported, they do
36We assume throughout this discussion that φ is proportional to w so that subsidies/taxes proportionally aﬀect
earnings/consumption both before and after age T.
37Combining beneﬁt reductions associated with welfare, the phase-out region of the Earned Income Tax Credit
25not reduce welfare beneﬁt levels, nor are they taxed. As a result, traditional welfare and general
assistance programs may encourage crime among the unskilled by encouraging individuals to earn
unreported criminal income (or to not report legitimate income – a diﬀerent form of crime).38
Since violent and property crime rates peak during the late teenage years, it might seem cost-
eﬀective to target wage subsidies to adolescents and young adults if reductions in crime are an
important policy objective. While a targeted wage subsidy should increase work and decrease
crime for the duration of the subsidy, it is also likely to reduce skill investment by raising the
opportunity costs of investment more than the returns. After all, if earnings are heavily subsidized
for a few years, students on the margin of dropping out may decide to work rather than stay in
school. Students that remain in school may spend more time working at the expense of studying.
These reductions in investment can leave individuals with less human capital at the the end of
the subsidy period, which can cause them to commit more unskilled crime thereafter than they
otherwise would have.39 In this case, the long-term eﬀects on crime go in the opposite direction as
the short-term eﬀects. The net lifetime eﬀect on crime is ambiguous.
Education and training subsidies (represented by a reduction in λ) indirectly aﬀect criminal
behavior among youth by increasing the costs of imprisonment – by encouraging investment in
human capital, they increase the marginal value of staying out of prison where the returns to that
investment can be reaped. Furthermore, investment spurred on by subsidies causes human capital
to accumulate faster, which raises the direct opportunity costs of crime later on. As a result, the
full impacts of investment subsidies will only be realized over time as human capital levels rise.
Unskilled crime should decline more with age in response to education and training subsidies, but
their eﬀects on white collar crimes should be smaller. (They may even increase white collar crimes
that oﬀer substantial returns to skill.)
for families with two or more children, and federal and state income taxes can generate eﬀective marginal tax rates
above 50% (e.g. see Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000).
38Most discussions of welfare program impacts on crime focus on the potential wealth eﬀects of income maintenance,
which suggests that welfare may reduce crime. These discussions neglect the income-oﬀset feature of welfare programs,
which leads to the high eﬀective marginal tax rates discussed here. Alternatively, generous beneﬁts may discourage
recipients from engaging in crime, since those beneﬁts are not generally extended to prisoners.
39A targeted wage subsidy could reduce crime at all ages if there are substantial returns to experience in the
criminal or legitimate sector. See Flinn (1986) for a model of crime in which market skills are acquired through work
rather than investment. We brieﬂy discuss the role of learning in the criminal sector in Section 6.
26Law Enforcement
Law enforcement policies that increase ﬁnes, prison sentences, or the probability of arrest will
deter crime. The approach taken here allows one to determine how these policies aﬀect investment
decisions and what eﬀect that has on criminal responses. Like a decrease in criminal ability, θ,
an increase in expected punishments will tend to encourage work over crime and will, therefore,
encourage education and training. This generates larger long-run impacts than those observed
immediately after a change in policy.
Increases in ﬁnes are largely skill-neutral; increases in the probability of incarceration or sentence
lengths are not. An increase in the probability of arrest or sentence lengths will raise the costs
of crime more for more skilled individuals and those with a higher learning ability, which should
further stratify the population into criminals and non-criminals by cognitive ability.
Empirically, how costly is expected incarceration? Not surprisingly, the answer depends on the
type of crime. The expected value of earnings from full-time work lost if incarcerated provides a
good approximation to the expected cost of incarceration for individuals planning to spend most
of their future time working, if they receive negligible utility from imprisonment and experience
no depreciation of human capital while in prison (δ = 0).40 Table 4 reports the probabilities of
arrest, conviction, and incarceration along with expected prison sentences for a number of violent
and property crimes. The ﬁnal column translates the expected time spent in jail for each crime
committed into lost earnings using the federal minimum wage of $5.15 per hour for eight hour work
days. There is a tremendous amount of heterogeneity in expected costs. Aggravated assault entails
an expected 63 days in prison costing $2,603 for a minimum wage worker, while murder entails an
expected 4,102 days (about 11 years, 2 months) in prison costing nearly $170,000 for that same
worker. Expected punishments from property crime are substantially smaller, averaging only three
days in prison for a loss of $130. In general, expected prison times are likely to be longer than
the amount of time it takes to plan and carry out most crimes, suggesting that the marginal cost
of committing a crime is largely determined by foregone opportunities associated with expected
40More generally, the expected cost of incarceration is likely to be larger than this (assuming negligible c), since the
total value of lost opportunities while incarcerated must be at least as large as the potential earnings from working
full-time during that period. Depreciation of human capital while in prison further adds to the cost of imprisonment
by reducing earnings potential after release.
27imprisonment. In this respect, deterrence is important. Still, Table 4 suggests that criminal returns
to most property crimes need not be very high for low skill workers to engage in them (if they do
not have a strong psychic aversion to prison).
The model predicts high rates of recidivism, since individuals committing crime in the ﬁrst
place have abilities and skills making crime a more attractive alternative. Getting caught does
little to alter those inherent abilities. In fact, depreciation in skills and negative stigma associated
with incarceration can reduce the returns to legitimate opportunities following release. In this case,
criminals just released from prison will commit more crime, work less, and earn lower wages than
they would have if they had never been caught. This highlights the tension between the deterrence
and incapacitation eﬀects of imprisonment (which serve to reduce crime among would-be oﬀenders)
with the potential negative eﬀects of incarceration on skills and marketability (which serves to
increase crime among those just released). On the one hand, policies that increase sentence lengths
or enhance the negative stigma of prison raise the expected costs associated with crime, which should
help reduce crime via the deterrence mechanism. On the other hand, they may encourage recidivism
by lowering the returns to legitimate work among ex-prisoners. Rehabilitation eﬀorts through
training and GED certiﬁcation pose the opposite dilemma. While they may help reduce recidivism,
they make imprisonment less costly.41 The tension between rehabilitation and deterrence makes
for interesting policy analysis and suggests that a policy which combines severe penalties and long
sentences for convicted criminals with prisoner training programs or employment subsidies after
release may be an eﬃcient way to maintain deterrence while also discouraging recidivism. It also
suggests that sentences should be more severe for individuals who have already been incarcerated
in order to oﬀset the reduction in opportunity costs associated with the depreciation in market
skills while in prison.
Inﬂuencing Early Skills, Tastes, and Opportunities
Thus far, we have discussed the characteristics A, H0, and θ as though they were immutable.
Yet, these tastes and abilities are almost certainly shaped at early ages by families, schools, and
neighborhoods.
Early preschool interventions can help make up for deﬁcits in learning or alter tastes for crime
41Freeman (1999) notes that most studies have found weak, if any, eﬀect of these types of programs on recidivism.
28among disadvantaged children, which can substantially reduce subsequent participation in crime.
For example, the Perry Preschool Program for disadvantaged minority children reduced lifetime
arrests through age 27 by 50% for program participants (Schweinhart, and Barnes, and Weikart,
1993). The Syracuse University Family Development Program showed an even larger reduction
in delinquency (Lally, Mangione, and Honig, 1998). These ﬁndings led Donohue and Siegelman
(1998) to conclude that small, rigorous early intervention programs may pay for themselves through
reduced crime rates alone, if they can be targeted to high crime groups.
Programs targeted at high-crime adolescents have also shown promise. In their study of the
Job Corps, which entailed 6-7 months of basic educational and vocational training for economically
disadvantaged adolescents, Long et al. (1981) estimated the social beneﬁts attributed to reduced
criminal activity to be $4,500 (in 1990 dollars) per participant – almost 30% of the total social
beneﬁt of the program. Taking a diﬀerent approach, the Quantum Opportunity Program provided
entering high school students with a mentor/tutor (25 students per mentor) that aided them in
schoolwork and community activities for four years. Financial incentives designed to encourage high
school graduation and college enrollment were provided for educational, service, and developmental
activities. Two years after program completion, randomly assigned participants were 34% more
likely to have received their high school diploma or GED and had half the number of total arrests
as non-participants (Taggart, 1995).
6 Criminal Experience
If the returns to crime rise with criminal experience, then the full beneﬁts from early criminal
activity include both current ﬁnancial rewards and any resulting increases in earnings from future
criminal activity. For suﬃciently large returns to experience, crime may increase with age. Given
that we observe sharp declines in most property and violent crimes over early years of the lifecycle,
it seems unlikely that there are substantial returns to criminal experience for those activities. Still,
this is a topic which has seen little research.42
42Imai, Katayama, and Krishna (2002) estimate the eﬀect of lagged criminal activity on current participation
in crime controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. They interpret their positive estimates as a return to criminal
experience; although, they do not account for responses in market human capital investments, which would also
generate a positive relationship. Bayer, Pintoﬀ, and Pozen (2003) provide some provocative evidence suggesting that
(social) learning may be important for crimes like burglary and drug dealing. They ﬁnd that juvenile oﬀenders in
prison with other oﬀenders of the same crime are more likely to be re-arrested for that crime. Strictly speaking, this
29If experience with crime raises the returns to crime, investment subsidies should have stronger
eﬀects than discussed above. As before, increases in early investment raise human capital levels
and reduce crime in subsequent periods. Any reductions in crime limit criminal experience, which
further discourages future crime. This creates a feedback which further encourages investment, since
more time will be spent working in the future. Adding learning in the criminal sector strengthens
the conditions that generate an early choice between a life of crime or a life of school and work.
The impacts of wage subsidy policies also diﬀer when criminal experience is important. Perma-
nent wage subsidies will have even greater eﬀects on crime at all ages by slowing the acquisition
of criminal experience. Short-term wage subsidies have much more complex eﬀects when criminal
experience aﬀects the returns to crime. Holding investment constant, reductions in crime associ-
ated with a short-term subsidy will reduce criminal experience. This suggests that a youth wage
subsidy may actually increase future work and reduce future crime. Now, consider the response
of investment. On the one hand, a wage subsidy directly encourages work over investment. On
the other hand, it discourages crime, which reduces the accumulation of criminal experience. This
discourages future crime and encourages future work, which indirectly raises the returns to current
investment. The net eﬀect on investment will depend on the increase in opportunity costs relative
to the increase in returns. Of course, all of these eﬀects interact making it diﬃcult to determine
the net eﬀect on investment during subsidized periods and crime after the subsidy ends. It is worth
noting that even if a short-term wage subsidy discourages investment, it may reduce crime at all
ages. This is because declines in market skill resulting from reductions in investment may be more
than oﬀset by declines in criminal skill resulting from a lack of criminal experience. In general, the
higher the return to criminal experience, the more eﬀective will be wage subsidies (permanent or
temporary) in reducing lifetime crime rates.
7 Conclusions
Violent and property crimes are mostly a problem among young uneducated men. The human capi-
tal approach developed in this paper argues that this can be explained by their low skill levels, which
imply low opportunity and incarceration costs for committing crime. A human capital framework
is not evidence in favor of a return to criminal experience, but it may suggest that some form of crime-speciﬁc skill
can be acquired or enhanced.
30also suggests that the relationships between white collar crime and both age and education should
diﬀer from those for lesser-skilled crimes. Crimes for which the returns are increasing in human
capital levels are more likely to be committed by educated and older workers with more human
capital than are crimes which oﬀer no return to skill. The empirical patterns for age-crime and
education-crime relationships across diﬀerent types of crime support these predictions. In general,
age-crime proﬁles have a less pronounced and later peak for white collar crimes. Using self-report
data from the NLSY, we estimate a strong negative eﬀect of education on both property and vi-
olent crime. Additionally, we estimate a strong negative correlation between cognitive ability and
unskilled crime, another prediction of the theory. In contrast, the empirical relationship between
education and white collar crime is quite diﬀerent. Our estimates from UCR data suggest that
arrest rates for white collar crime are increasing in average educational attainment.
Given the general accordance of a human capital-based theory of crime with the data, it seems
reasonable to consider its implications for government policy. We discuss a number of interesting
policy insights that cannot be learned from models of crime that abstract from the learning process
by exogenously specifying wage rates and opportunity costs. For example, the long-term impacts
of education and training subsidies, permanent wage subsidies, and law enforcement policies on
crime tend to be greater than the short-term impacts due to the cumulative eﬀects of changes in
human capital investment. More interestingly, policies that target wage or employment subsidies
to younger workers may look good in the short-run (while workers are subsidized); however, they
may have perverse long-term consequences on crime that result from reductions in human capital
investment.
Most previous economic research on crime has focused on the deterrent and incapacitation
eﬀects of stricter law enforcement. This study suggests that increases in public spending on en-
forcement should cause individuals to increase their investments in market skills. Furthermore,
policies that promote skill investment and work will reduce crime. The optimal mix of enforce-
ment, education, training, and wage subsidy policies has yet to be determined. The human capital
approach developed here suggests that all of these initiatives are likely to be important components
of an eﬀective crime-ﬁghting strategy.
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More than 1/2 
Income from 
Crime Violent Crime Property Crime
Less than 10 years 0.297 0.041 0.115 0.129
(0.035) (0.016) (0.024) (0.026)
10-11 years 0.337 0.042 0.139 0.218
(0.029) (0.013) (0.022) (0.026)
12 years 0.244 0.014 0.068 0.118
(0.017) (0.005) (0.010) (0.013)
More than 12 years 0.174 0.007 0.063 0.160
(0.015) (0.003) (0.010) (0.015)
Table 1: Self-Reported Criminal Pariticpation Rates by Education Status in NLSY
(Males Ages 20-23, 1980)
Notes: Violent cimes include using force to get something or attacking with intent to injure or kill.  Property 
crimes include thefts of at least $50 or shoplifting.  Drug sales include sale of marijuana or hard drugs.  Any 
crime includes participation either a violent, property, or drug crime. Standard errors in parentheses.Full Not Enrolled Living in a
Sample in School Central City
123
HS Graduate -0.304 -0.325 -0.327
(0.088) (0.125) (0.227)
Black -0.079 0.092 0.123
(0.119) (0.171) (0.226)
Hispanic -0.480 -0.304 -0.363
(0.170) (0.249) (0.299)
Highest Grade Completed -0.034 -0.028 -0.002
  by Mother (0.017) (0.026) (0.031)
Highest Grade Completed 0.025 0.026 -0.008
  by Father (0.012) (0.019) (0.024)
Intact Family -0.201 -0.244 -0.271
(0.087) (0.124) (0.190)
Teenage Mother (at Birth) 0.059 0.150 -0.317
(0.086) (0.116) (0.204)
Family Income (in $1,000) -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Living in an SMSA 0.096 0.045
(0.084) (0.120)
Local Unemployment Rate 0.000 -0.040 -0.046
(0.016) (0.022) (0.038)
State Punishment Rate -0.943 -1.550 -2.252
(0.348) (0.504) (1.004)
AFQT -0.008 -0.005 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Enrolled in School
Sample Size 1,901 812 370
Log Likelihood -947.89 -438.35 -195.66
Table 2: Coefficient Estimates from Probits for Self-Reported Criminal Income
(Males, 1980 NLSY)
Notes: All specifications use men ages 18-23 in the 1980 NLSY and control for region of residence.  
Individuals are considered criminal participants if they reported any income from crime or do not 
respond to that question.  All respondents without missing data are used (including blac, hispanic, and 
poor white oversamples) with 1980 sample weights.  Standard errors in parentheses.Crime Indicator
Participation 
Rate Coefficient Std. Error Mean Effect
Criminal Income 0.224 -0.304 0.088 -0.090
Violent Crime 0.078 -0.536 0.115 -0.087
Property Crime 0.162 -0.392 0.097 -0.101
Incarcerated from 1981-85 0.017 -0.741 0.187 -0.028
Table 3: HS Graduate - Dropout Difference in Criminal Participation and Incarceration
Effect of High School Graduation:
Notes: Sample includes all men at ages greater than or equal to 18 in 1980.  Estimates based on probit regressions that 
include the following regressors: age (in months), age-squared, high school graduation status, black and hispanic 
indicators, AFQT percentiles, whether the individual lived with both his natural parents at age 14, region of current 
residence, SMSA status, local unemployment rates, and state punishment rate (number of adults incarcerated divided by 
number of reported property and violent index crimes). Violent cimes include using force to get something or attacking 
with intent to injure or kill.  Property crimes include thefts of at least $50 or shoplifting.


























a Minimum     
Wage Worker
Violent Crimes 0.25 0.22 0.79 0.043 91 119.4 $4,920
  Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter 0.85 0.67 0.95 0.544 248 4,102.4 $169,019
  Forcible Rape 0.15 0.39 0.90 0.051 136 212.2 $8,742
  Robbery 0.15 0.36 0.89 0.047 94 134.8 $5,554
  Aggravated Assault 0.30 0.17 0.71 0.035 59 63.2 $2,603
Property Crimes 0.06 0.11 0.68 0.004 24 3.2 $130
  Burglary 0.07 0.27 0.76 0.015 29 13.2 $542
  Larceny-Theft (except motor vehicle theft) 0.05 0.08 0.61 0.002 20 1.4 $59
  Motor Vehicle Theft 0.10 0.08 0.73 0.006 17 3.1 $129
Notes:
Probability of arrest computed from crimes and arrests in the U.S. (Uniform Crime Reports, 2000) adjusted for non-reporting to the police (National Criminal Victimization Survey, 2000).  
It is assumed that all murders are reported to the police.  Probability of conviction conditional on arrest divides total arrests in the U.S. by total State and Federal convictions for 2000.  
Probability of incarceration conditional on conviction is based on reporting of State courts.  Estimated months served if incarcerated applies to State prisoners and is estimated by the U.S. 
Department of Justice based on sentence lengths handed out that year and the average percent of sentences served by prisoners released that year.  Unless otherwise noted, all criminal 
justice figures are for 2000 and are taken from Durose and Langan (2003) "Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2000".  In computing expected lost earnings from incarceration, the number 
of days served per crime was multiplied by $41.20, which represents the earnings for someone working 8 hours per day at the minimum wage of $5.15. Figure 1: Self-Reported Criminal Participation by Age and Final Schooling Attainment
(Males, 1980 NLSY)
















































































HS Dropout HS GraduateFigure 2: Arrest Rates (per 100,000 persons) by Age for Males










































































Income from Crime More than 1/2 Income from Crime
Violent Crime Property Crime